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Abstract
This thesis presents new results about fault attacks on cryptographic implementations, as
well as new countermeasures against fault attacks. We concentrate on digital signature
schemes.
If a cryptosystem is deployed on mobile devices like smartcards, the physical behaviour
of the smartcard offers additional sources of information (side-channels, such as timing
information or energy consumption). These side-channels can sometimes be used to break
cryptosystems, even if those are provably secure in a classical understanding.
This thesis investigates the side-channel given by faulty outputs. There have been two ma-
jor goals for this thesis: the development of new fault attacks on cryptosystems, and the
development of new algorithms, which are secure against fault attacks.
For new fault attacks, we present attacks on the two most popular public key cryptosy-
stems, RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems. For RSA, we extend a known fault attack on
one variant of repeated squaring to the other major variant. Thereby, we show that both
variants are equally susceptible to faults. We also investigate fault attacks on repeated
doubling used in elliptic curve cryptosystems. Here, we show that contrary to previous
believe, fault attacks are not easily defended against. We develop a new fault type and
show how this fault type can be used to successfully attack a large variety of variants of
repeated doubling.
We also present algorithms, which are secure against known fault attacks. For RSA, we
present a new algorithm for CRT-RSA, a fast and the most popular variant of repea-
ted squaring. For elliptic curve cryptosystems, we present a new algorithm for repeated
doubling on elliptic curves, which is secure against known and our newly developed fault
attacks.
